

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SEOUL 04087 01 OF 02 261418 Z

45

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

----- 053386

P R 260809 Z JUN 73

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8524

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION USUN NY

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 4087

EXDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, KS, KN, CH, UR

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP ON ROK FOREIGN POLICY CHANGES

SUMMARY: DISCUSSION OF KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY PROPOSALS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SERVED TO IDENTIFY ISSUES WHICH NOW REQUIRE FURTHER CONSIDERATION AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN ROKG AND U. S. ROKG HAS NOT SETTLED UPON ANY PARTICULAR APPROACH DEALING WITH SUCH ISSUES AS DEBATE IN UNGA, UNCURK, DUAL ADMISSION TO THE UN AND THE UNC BUT IS OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS. FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED INTEREST IN U. S. EXPLORING WHAT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE IN THE WAY OF AGREEMENT ON THE KOREAN QUESTION WITH SOVIETS AND THE CHINESE. END SUMMARY.

1. I CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER KIM YONG SHIK TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE ACTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO PRESIDENT PARK' S ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW ROK FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES. AT THE OUTSET, KIM EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE FOR THE ADVICE AND SUPPORT WE SUPPLIED AND IN PARTICULAR FOR THE STATEMENT ISSUED IN WASHINGTON. HE SAID THE INITIAL REACTIONS FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES WERE EXCELLENT AND THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF THE KOREAN PUBLIC WAS FAVORABLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SEOUL 04087 01 OF 02 261418 Z

2. I REMINDED HIM WE HAD EARLIER DISCUSSED THE DESIRABILITY OF GETTING TOGETHER TO BEGIN CONSIDERATION OF FOLLOW UP ACTIONS. IT SEEMED TO US AT THIS POINT THAT WE SHOULD AT LEAST IDENTIFY WHAT IT IS WE WOULD NOW SEEK TO DO IN SUPPORT OF THE NEW PROPOSALS. OBVIOUSLY SPEAKING WITHOUT CREFUL PRIOR CONSIDERATION, HE SAID HE BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONSIDER SUBMITTING A RESOLUTION AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CALLING FOR ADMISSION OF BOTH KOREAS. HE DID NOT THINK NORTH KOREANS WOULD ACCEPT SUCH A RESOLUTION BUT IT WOULD PUT ROK IN AN ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION.

3. I REPLIED, WITHOUT COMMENTING DIRECTLY ON THAT PROPOSAL, THAT I PREFERRED FIRST TO IDENTIFY THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS WE SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN PLANNING ACTIONS IN THE FUTURE. AS WE SEE IT, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED INCLUDING OUR STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL ASSEMBLY, INVOLVING SUCH THINGS AS AN INVITATIONAL RESOLUTION, THE QUESTION OF UNCURK, THE QUESTION OF DUAL ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND. IT WOULD APPEAR TO BE PREFERABLE TO THINK OF ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS TOGETHER SO THAT OUR POSITION IN REGARD TO ONE ELEMENT WAS COORDINATED WITH THE OTHERS. I SAID WE NEEDED TO CONSIDER VERY CAREFULLY WHAT KIND OF A RESOLUTION OR RESOLUTIONS WE MIGHT SUBMIT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED IN EXPLORING THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN UP WITH THE OTHER SIDE. BEFORE WE MOVED IN ANY DIRECTION WE WANTED TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE ROKG AS TO THE APPROACH, SUBSTANCE, AND TIMING OF OUR ACTIONS.

4. HE SAID HE AGREED AND WOULD WELCOME ANY SUGGESTIONS WE HAD. HE THOUGHT OUR PEOPLE IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON, WHO WERE EXPERIENCED IN THESE MATTERS, MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE USEFUL VIEWS ON HOW WE MIGHT PROCEED AND WERE BETTER EQUIPPED IN THIS REGARD THAN HIS OWN STAFF.

5. I ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT WOULD BE THE COMMUNIST REACTION. HE SAID PROPOSALS WERE GIVEN TO NORTH KOREAN LIAISON OFFICER AT PANMUNJOM ONE HOUR BEFORE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SEOUL 04087 01 OF 02 261418 Z

ANNOUNCEMENT ON JUNE 23. NORTH KOREANS WERE OPPOSITING PROPOSALS AND COULD BE EXPECTED TO PRODUCE THEIR STANDARD RESOLUTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN PRESENCE AND OF ALL U. S. FORCES IN KOREA. I ASKED HIM HOW HE VIEWED KIM IL-SUNG'S STATEMENTS DURING THE VISIT OF THE CZECH DELEGATION. HE SAID THESE WERE A REPETITION OF OLD

NORTH KOREAN POSITIONS BUT WERE BEING BROUGHT OUT AT THIS TIME TO REFUTE THE NEW ROKG PROPOSALS. NEVERTHELESS, OVER TIME IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BY-PASS THE UNACCEPTABLE DEMANDS OF THE NORTH KOREANS AND MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PROPOSALS WITH REGARD TO RELATIONS WITH THE UN AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

6. KIM SAID HE DID NOT SEE ANY PROBLEM IN DEALING WITH SUCH THINGS AS SEATING RESOLUTIONS, OR UNCURK BUT OUR APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND WOULD BE MORE COMPLICATED. I REPLIED THAT WE OURSELVES WISHED TO UNDERTAKE FURTHER STUDY OF THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF POSSIBLE TERMINATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, HAVING IN MIND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO PRESENT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD IN NO WAY REDUCE THE ROK'S SECURITY. WE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO EXAMINE WHAT MIGHT BE DONE WITH REGARD TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ITSELF, THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION, NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND BASE RIGHTS IN JAPAN AND THE QUESTION OF JOINT CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS OVER MILITARY FORCES IN KOREA.

7. HE ASKED IF IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO DISCUSS ALL OF THE ELEMENTS I HAD MENTIONED PLUS POSSIBLE ACTIONS WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE COMMUNISTS. I SAID WE MIGHT TAKE THESE QUESTIONS UP WITH THE PRC AND USSR WHEN WE HAD REACHED SOME UNDERSTANDING AS TO WHERE WE WANTED TO GO AND ASKED IF HIS GOVERNMENT MIGHT NOT TAKE UP SIMILAR QUESTIONS WITH NORTH KOREA THROUGH THE SOUTH-NORTH COORDINATING COMMITTEE MECHANISM. HE SAID HE DID NOT THINK ROKG WISHED TO RAISE THESE MATTERS WITH NORTH KOREANS AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER THEY DID WISH US TO BEGIN EXPLORING THE ISSUES WITH THE PRC AND THE USSR.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 SEOUL 04087 01 OF 02 261418 Z

HABIB

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNMAFVVZCZ

ADP000

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SEOUL 04087 02 OF 02 262342 Z

66

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

----- 058418

P R 260809 Z JUN 73

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8525

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION USUN MY

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 4087

EXDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

8. I ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT COULD BE CONTENT OF DISCUSSION WITH THE MAJOR COMMUNIST POWERS. HE REPLIED THAT CERTAINLY WE COULD TALK TO THEM IN TERMS OF A KOREAN QUOTE PACKAGE UNQUOTE. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE DISSOLUTION OF UNCURK, DUAL ADMISSION OF THE TWO KOREAS TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND DUAL RECOGNITION OF THE TWO KOREAS BY THIRD COUNTRIES. TO THESE COULD BE ADDED TERMINATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IF WE COULD SECURE THE NECESSARY GUARANTEES OR ARRANGEMENTS FOR ONGOING SECURITY IN REGARD TO THE ELEMENTS THAT I HAD PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED. OF COURSE ALL OF THIS NEEDED TO BE CONTINGENT UPON CONTINUED PRESENCE OF U. S. FORCES UNDER THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY IF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND WERE ABOLISHED.

9. I ASKED HIM WHAT HE SAW AS A POSSIBLE MECHANISM TO TAKE THE PLACE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND ITS SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT WISH TO SEE ANYTHING LIKE A NEUTRAL NATIONS PEACE KEEPING FORCE IN KOREA. THEY PREFERRED SOME PROCEDURE WHEREBY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD AFFIRM SOME ONGOING ALTERNATIVE TO THE EXISTING SITUATION. I ASKED IF THE SOUTH- NORTH COORDINATING COMMITTEE WOULD BE ABLE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SEOUL 04087 02 OF 02 262342 Z

TO ASSUME DIRECT BILATERAL RESPONSIBILITY OVER CERTAIN OF THE ELEMENTS DERIVING FROM THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, PRESUMING THESE MIGHT SUPPLEMENT SOME OVER- ALL UNITED NATIONS EXPRESSION OF CONCERN OR INTEREST. HE SAID HE HAD NOT THOUGHT ABOUT THIS BUT WOULD CONSIDER IT FURTHER.

10. HE SAID IF WE DID NOT FIND THE SOVIETS OR THE

CHINESE INCLINED TO BE VERY HELPFUL IN THE WAKE OF THE NEW PROPOSALS, WE WOULD THEN NEED TO CONSIDER HOW TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUES IN THE UNITED NATIONS WITHOUT ANY UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THE COMMUNIST POWERS. IN THIS EVENT, WE SHOULD THEN REVIEW WITH OUR MAJOR ALLIES HOW WE WOULD DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF INVITATION TO NORTH KOREA TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE, DUAL ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF UNCURK. RESOLUTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE DRAFTED ON THESE MATTERS AND WE WOULD NEED TO DEVELOP A STRATEGY DESIGNED TO AVOID THE TERMINATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND.

11. HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN WASHINGTON' S VIEWS ON EXACTLY WHAT WE MIGHT NOW PROPOSE IN REGARD TO ALL THE SPECIFIC ISSUES I HAD MENTIONED, AND HOW WE MIGHT DISCUSS THEM WITH THE MAJOR COMMUNIST POWERS. HE BELIEVED WE SHOULD BEGIN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE AND SOVIETS WITHOUT DELAY IN ORDER TO DISCOVER THE POSSIBILITIES. IF BY AUGUST IT WOULD APPEAR THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO GET ANYWHERE WITH AN OVER- ALL PACKAGE THEN WE WOULD STILL HAVE TIME TO DEVELOP AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH FOR THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I SAID I WOULD REPORT HIS VIEWS TO WASHINGTON AND BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH HIM SHORTLY.

12. COMMENT: AS A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION, I BELIEVE THE MEETING WAS USEFUL IN CALLING ROKG ATTENTION TO KEY ISSUES. IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT FOREIGN MINISTER KIM IS LOOKING TO US FOR MORE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THESE KEY ISSUES THAN I HAVE, UP TO NOW, BEEN ABLE TO GIVE HIM, BUT HE IS COMING ALONG NICELY. I INTEND TO EXPLORE THESE QUESTIONS WITH OTHER KEY FIGURES SUCH AS PRIME MINISTER KIM CHONG PIL, CIA DIRECTOR YI HU RAK
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SEOUL 04087 02 OF 02 262342 Z

AND PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR CHOE KYU HA.

13. I WOULD APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT' S COMMENTS AND FURTHER GUIDANCE. MY OWN VIEWS AS TO HOW WE MIGHT PROCEED WILL BE COVERED IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM.
HABIB

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNMAFVVZCZ

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

*** Current Classification *** CONFIDENTIAL

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts:
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 JUN 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: elyme
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SEOUL04087
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: SEOUL
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730629/aaaajozw.tel
Line Count: 272
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: elyme
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 OCT 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <09-Oct-2001 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <07-Nov-2001 by elyme>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> jms 980226
Subject: FOLLOW UP ON ROK FOREIGN POLICY CHANGES
TAGS: PFOR, CH, KN, KS, UR
To: CINCPAC
SECSTATE WASHDC
SS
TOKYO
USUN NEW YORK
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

